Hi all — just got back from a ski trip in Breckenridge, CO and it got me wondering about PE’s involvement in the ski industry…
PE Playbook: Alterra Mountain Company
State of Play
In January 2025, KSL Capital Partners raised a $3 billion continuation fund for Alterra Mountain Company, the owner and operator of Ikon Pass resorts. Alterra, valued at ~$7 billion enterprise value according to a 2024 industry article, reported ~$550 million EBITDA in 2023 per S&P Global, implying a ~12x EBITDA multiple.
With fresh capital from new investors in the continuation fund, KSL is expected to hold onto Alterra for the foreseeable future while continuing its acquisition spree to compete with industry leader Vail Resorts, the publicly traded company behind the Epic Pass.
But PE’s involvement in the ski industry isn’t new—it has shaped the sector for decades.
History of PE Behind the Duopoly
If you’ve been skiing in the U.S., you’ve probably encountered the Vail Resorts (Epic Pass) vs. Alterra Mountain Company (Ikon Pass) duopoly.
Vail Resorts (NYSE: MTN) – Owns or operates 42 ski resorts, including Breckenridge, Park City, and Whistler. Its Epic Pass gives access to over 80 ski resorts.
Alterra Mountain Company (PE-owned) – Owns or operates 18 ski resorts, including Deer Valley, Palisades Tahoe, and Steamboat. Its Ikon Pass gives access to over 60 ski resorts.
Despite controlling only 28% of the ~500 total ski resorts in the U.S., resorts under Epic and Ikon Passes cover ~75% of skiable acreage. And while the Vail-Alterra duopoly feels like a modern development, private equity has been shaping the ski industry since the 1990s.
Source: JPMorgan
1990s: Apollo’s First Play in Skiing
Like many early ski resorts, Vail Resorts was originally family-owned by George N. Gillett Jr., who also owned TV stations, real estate, and a meatpacking business through Gillett Holdings. However, his empire collapsed under the weight of junk bond-fueled expansion, leading to bankruptcy.
1992 – Apollo Global Management formed Apollo Ski Partners to acquire Vail out of bankruptcy. At the time, Vail only owned two resorts: Vail and Beaver Creek (CO).
1997 – Under Apollo’s ownership, Vail acquired Breckenridge and Keystone (CO) before going public.
2000s: Fortress’s Investment in Intrawest
Meanwhile, Alterra’s roots trace back to Intrawest, a ski resort operator that owned Winter Park (CO), Stratton (VT), and others.
2006 – Fortress Investment Group acquired Intrawest for $2.8 billion.
2008 Financial Crisis – The downturn forced Fortress to restructure the business, leading to significant losses. By 2013, Fortress exited via an IPO
2010s: KSL Enters the Game & Creates Alterra
2010 – KSL Capital Partners made its first ski investment, acquiring Squaw Valley (now Palisades Tahoe, CA).
2017 – KSL & Henry Crown & Co. (owner of Aspen) acquired Intrawest’s ski resorts for $1.5B and combined them with Squaw Valley.
2017 (later that year) – KSL & Henry Crown expanded further, acquiring Mammoth Resorts (CA) and Deer Valley (UT) to form Alterra Mountain Company.
Meanwhile, Vail Resorts kept acquiring aggressively, adding 30+ ski resorts between 2010 and 2020.
Investment Thesis
Investing in discretionary and seasonal sports like ski resorts is risky, but several attributes attract investors:
🚧 1. High barriers to entry
Ski resorts require massive upfront capital and significant ongoing maintenance, making new entrants extremely rare.
The last new U.S. ski resort built was Tamarack Resort (Idaho) in 2004, with a $1.5 billion buildout plan that included a ski resort, golf courses, and biking trails. It filed for bankruptcy in 2008—a cautionary tale of the industry's challenges.
Before Tamarack, the previous new ski resort was built in 1981, illustrating how consolidation has replaced greenfield expansion.
Beyond development costs, ski resorts have high fixed costs, which make it difficult for single-resort operators to compete. For example, Vail had $2.5 billion revenue vs. ~$1.5 billion fixed costs (labor, G&A, utilities, etc.) in 2023, representing ~60% fixed cost-to-revenue ratio. Platform businesses like Vail and Alterra benefit from operating leverage, as they spread costs across a large visitor base via Pass programs, meaning incremental pass sales dramatically improve margins.
Source: Sherwood
🎿 2. Steady (but cyclical) demand for ski activities
Despite being a luxury discretionary activity, the ski industry has shown long-term growth and quick post-COVID recovery.
Resilient customer base – Skiers tend to be affluent and brand-loyal, making them less price-sensitive than other leisure markets.
Cyclical risk – Ski visits decline during financial crises and are highly weather-dependent. The 2022/2023 season benefited from record-breaking snowfall, but future seasons may not be as favorable.
For Alterra’s new investors, one of the biggest questions is if the company can weather through any potential crisis.
Source: NSAA
💪 3. Pricing power
Vail and Alterra dominate the industry, creating a duopoly with a significant pricing power.
Over the last 3 years, both companies have increased their Pass prices by over 25%.
In contrast, Indypass, which provides access to 230+ independent ski resorts, has increased their price by only ~8%.
Source: SnowBrains
Unlike Alterra, who has continuously increased their Ikon Pass prices from $999 in 2020/2021 to $1,249 in 2024/2025, Vail had to reset its Epic Pass price in 2021/2022 to attract new pass holders. Question remains if Alterra can continue to increase prices and grow new customers at the same time, or if they will have to reset like Vail.
Source: Vail Resorts
🎫 4. Season pass revenue model
The introduction of season passes has transformed ski resort economics by improving revenue predictability and cash flow stability.
In 2008, Vail launched the Epic Pass program, allowing skiers to prepay for unlimited or discounted access to its resorts.
Since then, over 65% of Vail’s lift revenue now comes from season passes, providing a recurring revenue model that helps with capital planning and financing.
As we will cover shortly below, the pass business model was one of the cornerstones of Alterra, when KSL put the company together in 2018.
Source: Vail Resorts
Value Creation Playbook - Alterra
Alterra didn’t just emerge as a dominant player in the ski industry—it was intentionally built to compete with Vail Resorts by copying and refining Vail’s playbook.
1. M&A Roll-Up
Right out of the gate in July/August 2017, KSL acquired Intrawest ski resorts, Mammoth Resorts, and Deer Valley in the span of a month and combined with an existing company Squaw Valley to immediately create a platform with 13 resorts.
Alterra’s owned resort map in 2017
Source: StrattonRealEstate
Alterra has continued to acquire ski resorts and now boasts 18 resorts total. There are industry rumors that they are targeting to acquire mountains owned by Powdr, the 3rd largest ski resort company. A combination between Alterra and Powdr would create a company with nearly 25% of North America’s skiable acreage, right behind Vail’s 27%.
Source: JPMorgan
And these acquisitions have been accretive. For example, Vail has been acquiring ski resorts at an average EBITDA multiple of 8.5x, which compares to 10-12x EBITDA multiple Vail trades at.
2. Ikon Pass Revenue Model
Once the foundation was built, KSL wasted no time launching the Ikon Pass.
January 2018 – Four months after integration, Alterra introduced the Ikon Pass, partnering with 11 additional ski resorts to expand access.
Pricing Strategy – Initially priced at $899 for the 2018/2019 season, matching Vail’s Epic Pass.
Premium Positioning – Unlike Vail, which prioritizes volume, Alterra has focused on premium resorts, allowing it to outpace Vail in price increases
Source: Stormskiing
3. Diversification / Vertical Integration
Alterra has also made several acquisitions to diversify its business under KSL’s ownership.
For example, in 2022, Alterra acquired Aspenware, an e-commerce, guest registration, and trip management software. Aspenware is used by pretty much all ski resorts outside of Vail Resorts, including Powdr (3rd largest ski company), Boyne (4th largest company), and Jackson Hole Mountain Resorts.
This acquisition not only helps Alterra modernize its current and future resorts, but also provides real-time data on the performance of other key players (and potential acquisition targets) in the industry.
Looking Ahead
Alterra has been a phenomenal case study for KSL, rapidly growing into a dominant competitor to Vail. However, private equity’s track record in ski resorts has shown that the industry is highly cyclical, with past investments struggling during economic downturns.
Some early warning signs may already be emerging—for the first time since launching the Epic Pass in 2008, Vail Resorts reported a 2% volume decline in pre-season pass sales for the 2024/2025 season. This suggests that even the strongest players may not be immune to demand softening, raising the question of whether Alterra’s premium pricing strategy can hold up in an economic slowdown.
With KSL doubling down on Alterra through its $3 billion continuation fund, time will tell if this will be another major win for KSL and its investors, or if the ski industry is heading for a more challenging period.
Ski resorts remain a niche but fascinating private equity play, and PE’s influence on the industry has been nothing short of transformational. 🚀
Enjoy the ‘24/’25 ski season while it lasts! Picture below from Breckenridge last week. ~Edwin
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